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Review Article
The Third Restatement of Restitution, the
role of unjust enrichment and Australian
law
Joachim Dietrich*
The American Law Institute’s Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, pub/ished in 2011, may we//re-activate interest in restitution in
the United States. The princip/e of unjust enrichment is centra/ to the
Restatement. This article reviews the Restatement, first providing an
overview of its methodology and the fundamental distinctions that it draws.
Second, after a brief consideration of the role of unjust enrichment in (mostly
English) academic theory and in Australian law, this article will consider,
compare and critique the general role of that concept in the Restatement. I
conclude that the Restatement takes a very different approach to that of the
theorists: it is a pragmatic work that accepts the limitations of unjust
enrichment and rejects much of the dogma associated with unjust
enrichment theory.
Introduction
The American Law Institute’s Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment,1 is a two volume, monumental work of legal scholarship
published in 2011, authored by its reporter, Professor Andrew Kull, and
numerous advisers.2 A new Restatement has been a long time in coming. After
the publication of the First Restatement3 in 1937, a second Restatement was
commenced but abandoned before completion, perhaps reflecting a lack of
interest in the United States in restitution. That lack of interest is
acknowledged in the Restatement itself, which notes that ’Restitution has
remained intellectually important in other common-law countries, but in the
United States attention to it has declined over the past half-century’.4
Professor David Partlett has suggested that one reason for this decline is a
result of the significant influence of legal realism in the United States.5 The
lack of respect for restitution as a subject of academic interest is a product of
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University. My thanks go to Pauline Ridge for
her comments on an earlier draft.
1 American Law Institute Publishers, St Paul, 2011 (’Restatement’).
2 The ALI notes that ’most of the credit’ for the work must go to Andrew Kull (Restatement,
Foreword, p xiii) and clearly, his considerable intellectual imprint is evident throughout the
work.
3 American Law Institute, Restatement First, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, ALI
Publishers, St Paul, 1937, authored by W A Seavey and A W Scott.
4 Restatement, above n 1, p xiii. All references are to Vol 1 except where indicated.
5 D Partlett, ’Restitution: Ancient Wisdom’ (2003) 36 Loyola of Los Angeles L Rev 975.
Partlett describes the division (particularly evident in US law schools) between a doctrinal,
’embedded’ view of the law versus a ’non-embedded’ approach that prizes an external view
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its status as ’too doctrinal, almost too legal for moderu American scholars’.6
Similarly, Chaim Saiman suggests that American legal discourse and
methodology is starkly different to doctrinal scholarship that flourishes in
English law, such that the ’taxonomic account’ of restitution of the late
Professor Peter Birks, the foremost unjust enrichment theorist, is ’an
unnecessary and perhaps even unwelcomed development in American law’.7
Presumably, the new Restatement will re-activate interest in restitution in the
United States.
This article has several aims. First, the article reviews the Restatement,
providing an overview of its methodology and the fundamental distinctions
that it draws. Second, after a brief consideration of the role of unjust
enrichment in (mostly English) academic theory and in Australian law, this
article will consider, compare and critique the general role of that concept in
the Restatement. Finally, this article will illustrate these more general points
by considering how some specific topics are dealt with in the Restatement.
This last task can only be undertaken very selectively, given the depth and
breadth of coverage of the Restatement, comprising two volumes totalling
about 1400 pages.
The structure and approach of the Restatement
Like other Restatements, the Restatement promulgates a number of general
rules (70 in total), that are derived from the body of case law in various
jurisdictions in the United States, in order to accurately encapsulate the legal
rules that have developed. In exceptional cases, where a statement of principle
does not accord with the majority legal position in the case law, the
Restatement advances cogent reasons justifying the position that has been
adopted.8 Although the rules are beautifully drafted, it is the detailed
explanation of those rules in the commentary that gives substance to them.
The commentary provides rational explanations and reasons for why a
particular choice of rule has been adopted, and generally avoids conclusory
labels.9
Further, the Restatement illustrates the operation of the rules by giving
succinctly stated but realistic factual examples, usually based on real cases,
and the likely resolution to each example. This is one of the Restatement’s
great strengths. Given a factual scenario, lawyers know what they are dealing
with: they can immediately apply their own understanding of the law to the
of the law. The terminology is coined by T D Rakoff, ’Introduction’ (2002) 115 Harv L Rev
1278 at 1285-7. The ’non-embedded’ approach predominates in the United States with legal
realism one manifestation of this approach.
6 See ibid, at 977 (footnote omitted).
7 C Saiman, ’Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the Global Restitution
Party’ (2008) 28 OJLS 99 at 126. Saiman states that this is the result of the
’anti-doctrinalism’ exhibited in American legal discourse. Saiman’s article considers earlier
drafts of the new Restatement and I have found it particularly helpful in preparing this
review.
8 See, eg, above n 1, p 644: rule in relation to quantum meruit under a losing contract a
’minority rule’, though the majority cases, according to the Restatement, are often explicable
on other, justifiable grounds than those stated in the cases themselves (pp 64d--6) and see n
19 below.
9 See, eg, ibid, p 384.
162 (2011) 35 Australian Bar Review
facts, weigh up competing considerations and arguments, and compare their
solutions and reasons with those that are given. For a practitioner seeking
resolution to specific factual scenarios not previously dealt with in Australian
law, and for the law teacher looking for inspiration for problem setting, there
is a wealth of material here.
The foundation principle of the Restatement is in § 1: ’A person who is
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution’.
It is of particular interest that the Restatement describes the claim as a
’liability in restitution’ and that it retains ’Restitution’ in its title, despite
publicly aired objections by.BiNs.1° In part, this retention is a result of
history: the First Restatement adopted ’Restitution’ as describing both the
liability rules and the remedies and restitution’s embedded status in American
legal terminology ensures its continued use, though it must be noted that there
is some hesitancy in the Restatement in defending it.1l Nonetheless, the
Restatement states:
The title of the present Restatement incorporates both terms -- not to imply that they
are correlatives, much less synonyms, but to convey as clearly and immediately as
possible an accurate idea of the overlapping topics treated herein.12
No doubt, the new Restatement has been awaited with some excitement. One
undoubted source of interest, from my perspective, is how the Restatement
utilises unjust enrichment, in light of the major academic and judicial
developments in other common law jurisdictions, particularly in the United
Kingdom. How does the Restatement compare with the technical, doctrinal
approach of ’unjust enrichment theorists’, by which I mean Birks and other,
mostly academic, writers that have broadly embraced his methodology (if not
all the specifics of his theory)?
Thankfully, the Restatement takes a very different approach: to generalise,
10 P Birks, ’A Letter to America: The New Restatement of Restitution’ (2003) 3(2) Global
Jurist Frontiers art 2, noted and rebutted by the Restatement, above n 1, p 12. Birks rejected
the title ’restitution’, arguing that it is semantically unsound: ’Annual Miegunyah Lecture:
Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment’ (1999) 23 MULR 1 at 10. See also his final
work, seeking to set out a concise account of the law: Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed, OUR
Oxford, 2005 and from a similar Australian perspective see J Edelman and E Bant, Unjust
Enrichment in Australia, OUR Australia, 2006, particularly pp 3-6. Other commentators
continue to argue for the continued use of the label ’Restitution’. Cf A Tettenborn,
’Misnomer: A Response’ in W R Cornish, R Nolan, J O’Sullivan and G Virgo (Eds),
Restitution -- Past, Present & Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones, OUR Oxford
1998, p 31, at p 36. Those who do, do so from very different and contradictory standpoints.
Some, who Birks calls multi-causalists, see restitution as a response to different causative
event and either wish to study restitution as a remedial response (eg, G Virgo, The Principles
of the Law of Restitution, 2nd ed, OUP, Oxford, 2006), or are sceptical about the role of
unjust enrichment as a causative event altogether (eg, I M Jackman, The Varieties of
Restitution, Federation Press, Sydney, 1998). Others, who Birks calls mono-causalists, see
restitution as only ever arising from unjust enrichment and hence defend the synonymous
use of restitution and unjust enrichment (eg, M McInnes, ’Unjust Enrichment and the Perfect
Quadration Thesis’ [1999] Restitution L Rev 118). See Birks, Unjust Enrichment, ibid,
pp 277-81.
11 See the Restatement, above n 1, pp 3-12, particularly p 12, which notes some difficulties
with the use of this term, and p 7: ’most of the law of restitution might more helpfully be
called the law of unjust.., enrichment.’
12 Ibid, p 7.
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it is a pragmatic work that seeks accurately to describe the law as developed
in the US courts or, where there is uncertainty in the law or a lack of
uniformity between jurisdictions, the best solutions to specific problems. And
although the Restatement uses unjust enrichment as the central concept to
describe and justify in general terms the liability rules and remedies, it does
so with clear acceptance of its limitations. The commentary on § 1 states:
Such is the inherent flexibility of the concept of unjust enrichment that almost every
instance of a recognised liability in restitution might be referred to the broad rule of
the present section. The same flexibility means that the concept of unjust enrichment
will not, by itself yield a reliable indicator of the nature and scope of the liability
imposed by this part of our legal system. It is by no means obvious, as a theoretical
matter, how ’unjust enrichment’ should best be defined; whether it constitutes a rule
of decision, a unifying theme, or something in between; or what role the principle
would ideally play in our legal system. Such questions preoccupy much academic
writing on the subject. This Restatement has been written on the assumption that the
law of restitution and unjust enrichment can be usefully described without insisting
on answers to any of them.13
This conclusion is, on its face, startling, since precisely so much ink is spilt on
exactly such academic debate amongst unjust enrichment theorists. Yet the
’Restatement’s agnosticism’, to use Saiman’s term, is displayed towards much
of these (mostly English) theoretical debates.~4 Indeed, the Restatement
analyses legal issues by reference to the competing specific principles and
factors that are relevant to determining the outcomes: unjust enrichment is not
generally used to achieve this detailed work. Importantly therefore, although
unjust enrichment is a broad generic concept, it does not in all cases dictate the
specific rules or the outcomes of cases. Even in the paradigm case of
restitution, the recovery of mistakenly conferred benefits, the Restatement
states that unjust enrichment is ’too general to be of much practical assistance’
such that ’courts have developed specific rules for particular types of mistake
... instead of relying on general principles of unjust enrichment’.15 Indeed,
the Restatement goes further and acknowledges that not all of restitution is
about unjust enrichment: ’there are numerous situations in which a claimant’s
undoubted right to restitution (or restoration) of something does not depend on
the unjust enrichment of the defendant.’ 16
Importantly, § 1 of the Restatement must be read alongside § 2, setting out
certain fundamental limiting principles. These include that a valid contract
that defines the parties’ obligations within its scope, displaces ’to that extent
any inquiry into unjust enrichment’ (§ 2(2)); and that ’[1]lability in restitution
13 Restatement, above n l, p 4 (emphasis added). See also p 6: ’And yet the concepts of unjust
enrichment and restitution (in the literal meaning of "restoration") correlate only
imperfectly’.
14 Saiman, above n 7, at 120-1, gives the example of the question of whether one needs to
establish unjust factors, or whether there is a broader principle of liability wherever there is
an ’absence of basis’ for a transfer, as advocated by Birks, Unjust Enrichment, above n 10.
Compare the extensive discussion in Birks, Chs 5 and 6, and the brief dismissal of the
relevance of the point in the Restatement, above n 1, pp 5-6.
15 Restatement, above n 1, p 46.
16 Ibid, pp 6--7. The following example is given at p 7: ’Thus if a transfer has been induced by
misrepresentation, the transferor is entitled to rescission and restitution even if the transferee
-- having paid market value -- cannot plausibly be said to have been enriched.’
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may not subject an innocent recipient to a forced exchange’ (§ 2(4)). These
provisions make contract central to the operation of the relevant legal rules
and effectively relegate unjust enrichment to a subsidiary role. This is
consistent with the Australian legal position, which generally~7 precludes a
claim in restitution where an effective contract operates in relation to the
transaction in question.18 Although unjust enrichment theorists accept that a
valid contract generally trumps an unjust enrichment claim, the Restatement
prefers contract in far starker terms than English scholars, leading also to
’substantive disagreements’ as to outcomes, as Saiman probably correctly
notes.19 One related difference is ~hat many circumstances of restitution under
contracts terminated for breach, which many unjust enrichment theorists
describe in terms of independent unjust enrichment, are treated in the
Restatement as purely contractual remedies for breach alongside other
contractual remedies.2° Indeed, the Restatement concedes that conceptually,
these rules would fit better in contract but for pragmatic reasons are included
in the Restatement.21
The Restatement makes the division, broadly accepted in Australian law,22
between (1) restitution for wrongs, and (2) where defendants have received
benefits from claimants,23 by subtraction from the claimants. In the former
category, a benefit will have been obtained from third parties, but the
claimants have a claim based on the wrong that was done to them.
Interestingly, many unjust enrichment theorists acknowledge that unjust
enrichment is not an explanation of the cause of action, which resides firmly
in the wrong that justifies the remedy; as such, restitution is merely one
remedy amongst others that a claimant may choose. Still, despite this, the
Restatement frequently describes restitution for wrongs as explicable in terms
of reversing unjust enrichment.24 It seems clear, however, that the Restatement
17 See, however, Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall MallAustralia Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 516; 185
ALR 335; [2001] HCA 68; BC200107592, where restitution of a payment under the
relevant, still effective contract, was allowed; however, the payment was severable from the
other contractual payments and the relevant risk of the payment that was the subject of the
claim had not been allocated.
18 See Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2008) 232 CLR 635; 247 ALR 412; [2008]
HCA 27; BC200804500.
19 Saiman, above n 7, at 123, and n 136 and see the example at 1234. The Restatement’s
approach leads to the conclusion that where a party terminates a contract for breach and
seeks a quantum meruit for work done, then the contract price ought to impose a ceiling on
recoverable claims. Although this conclusion is also consistent with the views of most unjust
enrichment theorists (see Restatement, above n 1, p 645) it is contrary to the approach in
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234; 9
BCL 40. Interestingly, the Restatement notes, p 645, that ’[m]any of the decisions purporting
to award "restitution" unlimited by the contract price may be seen, on closer examination of
the facts, to employ the vocabulary of restitution as a means to compensate plaintiffs for
damages that are merely hard to prove’.
20 Restatement, above n 1, §§ 37-39 and pp 479-80, 606-12.
21 Ibid, p 612.
22 See, eg, K Mason, J W Carter and G J Tolhurst, Mason and Carter.’s Restitution Law in
Australia, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2008, at [159]-[161]. See also
Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544 at 557; 128 ALR 201; (1995) 69
ALJR 362; BC9506414.
23 This is the terminology in the Restatement and I adopt it here.
24 Restatement, above n 1, p 10.
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is using the term merely to describe the particular remedy, not to assert the
reasons for that remedy (which is the tort, breach of fiduciary duty, or other
wrong).
The second type of claim is one in which the restitutionary claim arises
irrespective of the commitment of any wrong, and the claim is an independent
one in unjust enrichment based on a corresponding loss of the claimant.
The Restatement follows this division in its organisation. Volume 1 includes
liability rules that are said to arise from unjust enrichment and where the
enrichment has been obtained from the claimant. Volume 2 deals with liability
for wrongs giving rise to benofit based remedies, as well as with remedies
generally and ’defenses’. The ’remedies and defenses’ sections are of
particular interest, as will be seen below, since the measure of enrichment
varies considerably depending on the reasons for ’restitution’, such that even
loss allocation can occur; and fault (usually of the defendant, but also
sometimes of the claimant) is critical to the precise working out of the
appropriate remedy. As a result, some cases of ’restitution’ dealt with in the
Restatement are about responses other than returning a benefit retained. Loss
compensation or allocation are plausible outcomes in many cases, as
discussed below.
The final general point that I wish to note is that the Restatement does not
draw a distinction between legal or equitable rights of restitution (§ 4(1)). This
approach means that there is no need to establish the inadequacy of remedies
at law (§ 4(2)). Hence, the Restatement nearly always ’describes liabilities and
remedies ... without reference to their origins in law or equity’.25 In this
fusionist approach, the Restatement is at odds with the position in Australia,
where the question of the extent of fusion still engenders considerable debate
with competing forces pulling in different directions.26 The fusionist approach
will be welcomed by unjust enrichment theorists, who are staunch advocates
of a taxonomy that is independent of any historical jurisdictional
distinctions .27
Academic developments in unjust enrichment theory
The Restatement arrives after more than two decades of considerable
academic theoretical writing on unjust enrichment and its role in the law,
particularly in the United Kingdom but also Australia and Canada. In
particular, the late Professor Birks was at the forefront of imposing a rigorous
structure and taxonomy on the law of unjust enrichment and, indeed, private
law as a whole.28 Much has been written about this elsewhere. It suffices to say
25 Ibid, p 28 (emphasis added).
26 Eg, as is evidenced by the devotion of a prestigious conference and book of conference
papers to the topic of ’Fusion’: see S Degeling and J Edelman (Eds), Equity in Commercial
Law, Thomsons, Sydney, 2005. The papers reflect a diversity of views, and cf the rigidly
anti-fusionist approach of R Meagher, J D Heydon and M Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and
Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedy, 4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2002, the
foremost equity textbook in Australia.
27 See Birks, Unjust Enrichment, above n 10, and P Birks, ’Equity in the Modern Law: An
Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 UWALRev 1, and A Burrows, ’We Do This at Common
Law But That in Equity’ (2002) 22 OJLS 1.
28 For criticism of the broader taxonomical project, see J Dietrich, ’What is "Lawyering"? The
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that Birks advocated a theory-driven approach to legal reasoning29 and set out
stages of analysis for all unjust enrichment problems, such that liability
depends on the answers to five questions:3o
1) Was the defendant enriched?
2) Was the enrichment at the expense of this claimant?
3) Was the enrichment unjust?
4) What kind of right did the claimant acquire?
5) Does the defendant have a defence?
Of itself, these might seem rather general, particularly because the stages
are themselves derived directly frdm, indeed, are little more than a restatement
of, the concept of unjust enrichment itself.31 But these elements are merely the
starting point for much theorising about the precise meaning and content of
these stages of analysis, with considerable intellectual energy devoted to this
task.32 Indeed, in my view, Birksian unjust enrichment theory tends toward a
dogmatic and restrictive legal approach.33 It is not an overstatement to say that
’unjust enrichment’ has become exceedingly complex.34
Given the very detailed exposition of the meaning of the individual
elements, this may lead to the theory, and the content of the stages of inquiry,
subsuming the individual liability rules that might otherwise apply absent
unjust enrichment. The specific details of the rules will be fused into the
’unjust factors’ or the definition of ’enrichment’. Hence, unjust enrichment is
Challenge of Taxonomy’ (2006) 65 CLJ 549 and J Dietrich, ’The "Other" Obligations
Category in the Classification of Obligations’ in A Robertson (Ed), The Law of Obligations:
Connections and Boundaries, UCL Press, London, 2004, Ch 7.
29 See, eg, P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989
reved, Chs I-V generally, and particularly pp 19-21, and Unjust Enrichment, above n 10.
30 Birks, Unjust Enrichment, above n 10, p 39.
31 Cf P Birks, ’Annual Miegunyah Lecture: Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment’
(1999) 23 MULR 1 at 7.
32 See generally, Birks, Unjust Enrichment, above n 10. There appears to be considerable
judicial acceptance of this approach in the United Kingdom: see, eg, Deutsche Morgan
Grenfell Group plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] UKHL 49; [2007] AC 558;
[2007] 1 All ER 449; [2006] 3 WLR 781 and Sempra Metals Ltd v Her Majesty’s
Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2007] UKHL 34; [2008] 1 AC 561; [2007] 4 All ER 657;
[2007] 3 WLR 354 which illustrate the English courts engagement with unjust enrichment
theory, and the adoption of the stages of analysis.
33 See J Dietrich, ’Giving Content to General Concepts’ (2005) 29 MULR 218, particularly
at 230-3.
34 On the complexities of unjust enrichment, see, eg, Hedley’s conclusion that ’the subject has
become more and more technical ... [but] is acknowledged to explain less and less ...
There is more and more schematising and theorising, to less and less effect’. See S Hedley,
’The taxonomic approach to restitution’ in A Hudson (Ed) New Perspectives on Property
Law, Obligations and Restitution, Routledge-Cavendish, United Kingdom, 2004, Ch 7,
p 152 and generally; and also S Hedley, ’The Empire Strikes Back? A Restatement of the
Law of Unjust Enrichment’ (2004) 28 MULR 759 at 781:
The high degree of precision that Birks demands ensures that there is a continual battle
simply to keep academic theory and judicial pronouncements within hailing distance of
one another. The language is becoming denser and more intense. Birks... acknowledges
that his approach is making unjust enrichment abstract and technical.
Practitioners have also expressed concern about the complexity of the theory: see the
views noted by A Burrows and E Peel (Eds), Commercial Remedies: Current Issues and
Problems, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, ’Restitution of Unjust Enrichment:
Review of Discussion’, p 186.
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used to rationalise past decisions, solve future problems and shape liability
rules.35 All this can be contrasted with the Restatement which notes that the
’understandable temptation to limit the far-reaching notion of unjust
enrichment within the manageable confines of a checklist.., usually leads to
trouble’ .36
Another feature of Birks’ theorising on private law is his advocacy of a
linear approach to remedy in which causes of action are strictly classified and
linked to their concomitant remedy, as compared with remedial discretion
which encompasses the ide,a thot courts may choose from a range of possible
remedies in response to a particular cause of action?v Birks strongly criticised
remedial discretion as a retreat from rationality and a move towards ’intuitive’
decision-making.38 Again, this is contrary to the Restatement’s approach, with
its flexible approach to remedy, including proprietary remedies (a particular
focus of Birks’ disapproval) as discussed below.
Overall, then, it appears from this brief overview that Saiman is correct in
concluding that, in nearly all respects, Birks’ theories are quite alien to US
jurisprudence, methodology and discourse. As Saiman states: ’Birks assumed
that even the most difficult of legal disputes can be apolitically resolved via
the conceptual analysis of legal rules... It is exactly this mode of reasoning
that engenders deep scepticism within the American academy.
The role of unjust enrichment in Australia
In Australia, unjust enrichment theory has been sceptically received by the
High Court, despite its favourable reception by many academics and some
lower courts, and the prominence given to unjust enrichment in the UK House
of Lords (now the Supreme Court). The High Court has asserted, in one case
35 Emblematic of the scale of the transformation being sought to be attained here are the
attempts to change the whole language of the law, to re-badge the existing legal rules and
concepts and to add new ones. For example, terms such as ’quasi-contract’, ’restitution’ (as
describing the category of causes of action), ’quantum meruit’ and ’money had and received’
are to be banished. Terms such as ’free acceptance’, ’subjective devaluation’, ’unjust
enrichment’ and ’interceptive subtraction’ are part of the new language of the law. The
changes in language do not necessarily make the subject easier to understand and may even
lead to changes in the law. As Hedley, ’The taxonomic approach to restitution’, ibid, p 154
has said, unjust enrichment theorists ’say they are against old obscure terminology... They
mean that they want to replace it with new, equally obscure terminology.., which might
almost have been designed to discombobulate and alienate their listener’.
Interestingly, the Restatement uses terms such as quantum meruit, but eschews much of
the ’modern’ terminology.
36 Restatement, above n 1, p 15.
37 Justice Keith Mason of the NSW Court of Appeal sums up the progression of legal thought
when he states that as a ’rough generalisation ... we have progressed from the notion of
"where there"s a remedy there’s a right past the notion of "where there’s a fight, there’s a
remedy", to the notion of "where there’s a right, there"s an issue of remedies’. See the Hon
Justice K Mason, ’Opening Address’ (1998) 13 JCL 1 at 1.
38 Compare P Birks, ’Three Kinds of Objections to Discretionary Remedialism’ (2000) 29
WALR 1 at 17.
39 Saiman, above n 7, at 106-7.
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with strong criticism of those who flirt with the opposite views,4° the serious
limitations of the unjust enrichment concept. That concept has been variously
described, by Gummow J, as being restrictive in its effect, as a form of
’top-down reasoning’ that dictates outcomes,41 distorts ’well settled’
(equitable) principles, and generates fictions, so that dogma restricts
’substance and dynamism’ in the law.42 These sentiments were unanimously
endorsed by five members of the court in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v
Say-Dee Pty Ltd.43 More recently, in Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (In
Liq)44 four members of the High Court stated that unjust enrichment is not a
’principle which can be taken~ as a sufficient premise for direct application in
particular cases’
There is therefore in the court strong resistance to those manifestations of
unjust enrichment theory in which unjust enrichment forms part of a strict
taxonomical and conceptual framework that dictates particular stages of
inquiry for all cases of restitution.
The role of unjust enrichment in the Restatement
Introduction
In light of these developments, I propose to consider how unjust enrichment
is used in the Restatement. Although unjust enrichment is central to the whole
40 See, eg, the criticisms by the High Court in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd
(2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22; BC200703851 of the NSW Court of
Appeal decision overturned in that appeal.
41 See Gummow J in Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 516;
185 ALR 335; [2001] HCA 68; BC200107592 at [73]. ’Top-down reasoning’ is reasoning
’by which a theory about an area of law is invented or adopted and then applied to existing
decisions to make them conform to the theory and to dictate the outcome in new cases’. The
term derives from Judge Posner and is also referred to by McHugh J in McGinty v Western
Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 232; 134 ALR 289; (1996) 70 ALJR 200; BC9600206.
Gummow J (at [72]) cautions against:
judicial acceptance of any all-embracing theory of restitutionary rights and remedies
founded upon a notion of ’unjust enrichment’. To the lawyer whose mind has been
moulded by civilian influences, the theory may come first, and the source of the theory
may be the writing of jurists not the decisions of judges. However, that is not the way in
which a system based on case law develops; over time, general principle is derived from
judicial decisions upon particular instances, not the other way around.
42 See ibid, at [74]. Gummow J concludes:
There is support in Australasian legal scholarship for considerable scepticism respecting
any all-embracing theory in this field, with the treatment of the disparate as no more than
species of the one newly discovered genus.
43 (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007] HCA 22; BC200703851 at [151]-[156] per
Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ. The joint judgment seemingly
considers it to be inimical to common law judicial method and reasoning, particularly when
equitable principles are at issue. The joint judgment also rejects, in a reference to Birks’
school of unjust enrichment theory, ’a mentality in which considerations of ideal taxonomy
prevail over a pragmatic approach to legal development’: at [154].
44 (2008) 232 CLR 635; 247 ALR 412; [2008] HCA 27; BC200804500..
45 See ibid, at [85], per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ (in a joint judgment) and
more generally, at [83]-[86]; and see also Friend v Brooker (2009) 239 CLR 129; 255 ALR
601; [2009] HCA 21; BC200904502 at [7] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Bell JJ.
Some of these views echo views expressed by this author prior to these decisions. See
J Dietrich, Restitution: A New Perspective, Federation Press, Sydney, 1998.
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Restatement and, at times, its role may even be overstated,46 for the most part,
the Restatement exhibits a pragmatic and flexible approach to unjust
enrichment and does not adopt the doctrinal approaches of the theorists. As
already noted above, the Restatement uses the concept as a generic principle
that has some obvious guiding influence, but the Restatement accepts that not
all of the law of restitution is explicable in terms of unjust enrichment. Further,
the precise rules cannot be articulated by the use of more technical refinements
of unjust enrichment, nor can they be supplanted or replaced by it. Finally, the
specific rules and their application are not always consistent with remedying
unjust enrichment via the restitution of benefits.
These general propositions will be supported with some specific examples,
starting with the role of fault in relation to liability, as well as in the change
of position defence in particular. I will then briefly consider the Restatement’s
approach to proprietary remedies, and will then conclude with consideration
of how the Restatement resolves two specific problems dealt with by the High
Court.
’Fault’
One significant difference between English unjust enrichment theory and the
general approach of the Restatement that is evident throughout the work
relates to the relevance of ’fault’. According to unjust enrichment theory, a
defendant’s obligation to make restitution is said to be ’strict but fragile’47
(that is, subject to defences). So it is said that ’[f]ault can be relevant to the
defence [of change of position] ... but should be ignored when considering
the ground of restitution’.48 Hence, leaving aside the acknowledged but
narrow role of the fault of a defendant, but not a claimant, in change of
position, fault is sidelined and its relevance minimised. By way of
comparison, the Restatement gives a significant conceptual role to broadly
defined notions of ’fault’ (§ 52(1) quoted below). Such fault includes both
conduct of defendants (for example, in causing a particular transaction) and,
at times, on the part of claimants. Such fault is relevant in determining:
(1) liability, including by balancing the respective conduct of the parties;
(2) more importantly, the measure of any such liability, and (3) the operation
of applicable defences. On the Restatement’s approach, the measure of
’enrichment’, and hence the remedy, can vary as a result of, and is moulded
according to, relevant fault factors, so that in some cases, ’restitution’ is not
46 Eg, the rules on fraud in § 13 are situated in Vol 1 of the Restatement, and hence within
independent unjust enrichment liability. Yet the commentary on § 13 acknowledges that
damages are always an alternative to any restitutionary response such as rescission and
consequent restitution. Indeed, § 13 does not even set out the elements of fraud: the cause
of action is firmly within the law of torts. It therefore appears that restitution is merely one
possible remedy amongst others and that ’fraud’ could thus more appropriately be seen as in
a different category of liability, in the same way that the Restatement treats some
restitutionary contract remedies (discussed text to nn 20-21 above). The Restatement in this
context appears to be using unjust enrichment to describe one available remedy, rather than
to explain the liability rule.
47 See, eg, P Birks, ’Knowing Receipt: Re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts Revisited’ (2001) 1(2)
Global Jurist Advances Art 2 at 17.
48 G Virgo, ’Enrichment: The Case of the Cherished Mark’ (2004) 63 CLJ 280 at 282.
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focused on the return of benefits at all. Instead, it achieves other goals such as
loss allocation and compensation where no real benefit has been obtained or
retained.
The Restatement’s approach is evidenced by the general scheme of
§§ 49-52, a scheme that acknowledges that there are many different ways in
which enrichment can be measured (§ 49) and indeed, that ’non-innocent’
defendants may be subject to much more onerous burdens than merely
returning a surviving enrichment.
For example, § 52(1) states:
A defendant who is not a conscious wrongdoer (§ 51(3)) may nevertheless be
responsible for receiving, retaining, or dealing with the benefits that are the subject
of a restitution claim. For purposes of this section, a defendant bears responsibility
when a significant cause of the defendant’s unjust enrichment is the defendant’s
(a) negligence;
(b) misrepresentation, whether tortious or not;
(c) breach or repudiation of a contract with the claimant, whether enforceable or
not;
(d) unreasonable failure, despite notice and opportunity, to avoid or rectify the
unjust enrichment in question; or
(e) bad faith or reprehensible conduct.
Accordingly, under § 52(1), breach of a non-effective contract, or a
non-tortious misrepresentation, are to be treated in similar terms as the
commission of a breach of contract or tort. This means, for example, that a
defendant at ’fault’ in the attenuated definition of § 52(1) cannot rely on the
change of position defence (§ 52(3), § 65), and therefore liability to make
restitution is not subject to the limitation of returning surviving enrichment
only. An assessment of who breached the parties’ (unenforceable) agreement
(to take the ’contract’ example) thus becomes critical to whether liability is
one of returning benefits only, or instead one of making good the claimant’s
loss. The Restatement thus appears to give effect to similar loss compensatory
principles as those of contract and tort. Presumably, therefore, if A pays
money to B under an unenforceable contract, which B expends bona fide on
preparation for performance, but B then repudiates, B would not be able to
rely on a change of position defence (§ 52(3)). A would thus be entitled to full
’restitution’, effectively compensating A’s loss, since B cannot realistically be
said to have been enriched. Such a result is correct, but does not have much
to do with unjust enrichment.
The general approach is reflected in the specific rules in the Restatement,
where numerous examples of the role of fault in determining liability can be
found: the rules relating to the mistaken improvement of property, remedies
for which frequently turn on the allocation of loss even as between two
innocent parties;49 frustration;5° claims arising from breaches of
49 See Restatement, above n 1, p 115: ’the remedies for mistaken improvement frequently turn
on the allocation of a loss .... [and] draw on an amalgam of enrichment and compensation
principles, combining a recovery for benefits conferred with an allocation of loss according
to relative fault.’
50 Ibid, § 34, and pp 552-3.
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unenforceable contracts;5~ and the rules relating to rescission.52 And in one
context, that of domestic property disputes arising between former ’unmarried
co-habitees’ (de facto partners), where notions of fault are not relevant, the
Restatement adopts a flexible, policy-driven approach that also is not
consistent with unjust enrichment principles, conceding that ’some
fundamental requirements of a liability in restitution are noticeably relaxed’~3.
I turn to the change of position defence that may defeat a claim for
restitution for money received from a claimant. The Restatement states that the
relative negligence of both the defendant and claimant should relevantly be
considered when applying a change of position defence, such that a balancing
of the equities respectively can be made (see § 65 and commentary,
particularly (g) and (h) and § 52(3)). On this view of the defence, it is not
solely concerned with identifying surviving enrichment.~4 A widely-defined
fault concept is again central to the operation of the rules: fault is not limited
to ’bad faith’ conduct, as it is in the United Kingdom and according to unjust
enrichment theory.~
By way of comparison, English unjust enrichment theorists generally frown
upon attempts to incorporate more equitable, broader standards or concepts
into the change of position defence. Unjust enrichment theorists have widely
condemned any attempts by courts to seek to ’balance the equities’ between
defendants and claimantsP6 It is not clear to me why a flexible change of
position defence is not an appropriate mechanism for giving recognition to the
varying degrees of fault of claimants and defendants, in order to balance their
respective interests in the myriad of diverse factual variations that may arise?
As the Restatement concludes, ’a recipient whose negligence exceeds that of
the claimant in the transaction by which the recipient has been unjustly
enriched will not be able to defend on the basis of change of position
(§ 52(3))’.57
51 The ’measure of enrichment may reflect the court’s assignment of blame’ (Restatement,
above n 1, p 398) and thus protects claimants against loss (Illustrations 2 and 4,
pp 399-400).
52 Although rescission of the transaction could be seen as a form of specific restitution, it is
available irrespective of whether any actual gain by the defendant (or corresponding loss to
the claimant). See Restatement, above n 1, § 54, vol 2, pp 263-4: rescission includes the
mutual restoration of performance there under, requiring counter restitution and
compensation of defendant’s losses, unless the defendant should bear the uncompensated
loss and see, in particular § 54(3b).
53 Restatement, above n 1, § 28, p 415. See also Saiman, above n 7, at 122, who notes
criticisms of the draft § 28 and concludes that ’even the most doctrinally-oriented American
scholarship cannot avoid the use of private law doctrines as a tool of social policy’. It would
seem that the criticisms that Birks made of earlier policy-driven ’unjust enrichment’
reasoning in the same factual context in Canada apply equally here. See P Birks, ’Book
Review’ (1991) 20 Can Bar Rev 814.
54 Hence, in some cases, defendants may not have to give up an enrichment that they still
retain, whereas in other cases, defendants may have to make ’restitution’ of an enrichment
that they no longer have.
55 See the discussion in Birks, Unjust Enrichment, above n 10, pp 214-19.
56 As was done in National Bank of New Zealand v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd
[1999] 2 NZLR 211 (NZCA). For criticism, see A Burrows, ’Clouding the Issue on Change
of Position’ (2004) 63 CLJ 276, criticising English judgments adopting similar reasoning.
57 Restatement, above n 1, vol 2, p 530 (emphasis added) and see also comment h. The
Restatement does not quite go as far, however, as the NZ Court of Appeal has in National
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Proprietary remedies
Further evidence that the Restatement is not principally an ideological work
and is instead one that retains its ’American’ approach to legal methodology
can be seen in its pragmatic approach to proprietary remedies. The
Restatement accepts, as does Australian law,58 a broad and flexible remedial
constructive trust. Under the Restatement, such constructive trust may be
applied wherever a defendant is ’unjustly enriched by the acquisition of
identifiable property’ or its traceable substitute (§ 58 and § 59) either as a
result of a wrong or by subtrac~tior~ from the claimant.59 Further, there is a wide
discretion to attach conditions to the remedy in order to ’complete justice’ .6o
The Restatement’s approach again contrasts sharply with that of unjust
enrichment theorists and that of the English courts, which display a strong
distrust of a flexible approach to remedies with proprietary consequences,
seen as a threat to ’fixed’ property fights (and perhaps even the rule of law).
Hence, the English courts have rejected the remedial constructive trust.61 As
Lord Millett said in Foskett v McKeown,62 in the context of the tracing rules:
Property rights are determined by fixed rules and settled principles. They are not
discretionary. They do not depend upon ideas of what is ’fair, just and reasonable’.
Such concepts, which in reality mask decisions of legal policy, have no place in the
law of property.63
The rules are said to reflect nothing more than ’hard-nosed’ property law.64
There are echoes of Birks here:
The business of the lawyer can only be to say with as much precision as possible on
what facts proprietary interests arise. ’Do you or do you not have a proprietary
Bank of New Zealand v Waitaki International Processing (NI) Ltd [1999] 2 NZLR 211 in
apportioning losses between parties, rather than merely allocating entirely to one or the
other. Although the outcomes of any apportionment based on the parties’ respective fault
may appear to be arbitrary, so it is with the contributory negligence defence in torts as well,
and few seriously argue that there is no need or role for such a defence. A hard and fast rule
that the change of position defence does not contain within it the capacity for courts to
flexibly consider a range of factors other than the extent of the defendant’s disenrichment
(and any bad faith on his or her part) may simply be inadequate for the very different type
of work it needs to perform.
58 See, eg, Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; 62 ALR 429; 60 ALJR 52; BC8501051;
and Bathurst City Council v PWC Properties Pty Ltd (1998) 195 CLR 566; 157 ALR 144;
[1998] HCA 59; BC9804991.
59 However, any windfall gains to a defendant that exceeds the claimant’s loss is not
recoverable as against third party creditors (§ 61).
60 Restatement, above n 1, vol 2 p 298.
61 Eg, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] NLJR 877; [1996] AC
669; [1996] 2 All ER 961; [1996] 2 WLR 802, Lord Browne-Wilkinson concluding that
English law has not recognised such a trust. Similarly, in the Privy Council: Re Goldcorp
Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74 at 104; [1994] 2 All ER 806; [1994] 3 NZLR 385; [19941 3
WLR 199, judgment delivered by Lord Mustill.
62 Foskett v McKeown [20001 UKHL 29; [2001] 1 AC 102; [2000] 3 All ER 97; [2000] 2 WLR
1299.
63 [2001] 1 AC 102 at 127 per Lord Hoffman (Lord Browne-Wilkinson concurring); [2000] 3
All ER 97; [2000] 2 WLR 1299; [2000] UKHL 29.
64 Ibid, at AC 109 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
The Third Restatement of Restitution 173
interest?’ is, and should remain, a technical question, utterly different from ’Do you
or do you not deserve to suffer less than these other colleagues in calamity?’65
Recent Australian cases and the relevant rules in the
Restatement
Finally, it is an interesting exercise to compare the Restatement’s solution to
two specific issues that the High Court has considered in the last two decades.
The first concerns the liability of a beneficiary of work performed by a
claimant, for which work tlae beneficiary has contracted with a third party to
pay. The problem often arises where a sub-contractor who has completed
substantial work to the benefit of an owner but has been left unpaid by a head
contractor. In a similar context, in Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (In
Liq),66 the High Court took a restrictive approach: the existence of a binding
contract with the third party precluded a similar claim. The judgment did not
suggest any exceptions and the High Court considered that unjust enrichment
had no relevance. The Restatement adopts a broadly similar position. Under
§ 25, a defendant in such cases is not generally enriched, nor is any
enrichment ’necessarily tmjtlst’.67 Nonetheless, in limited circumstances,
where a defendant has expressed a willingness to pay for a service (even to a
party other than the claimant), saved a necessary expense or realised a benefit
in money, and where the defendant will not as a practical matter be required
to pay another for the services, (compare § 25(2) and, for example,
Illustrations 9, 11 and 13), the Restatement considers that there is limited
scope for recovery. This appears a slightly more claimant-friendly approach
than Lumbers appears to adopt.68
I turn to the second issue, namely, the relevance of ’passing on’. Where
claimants seeking restitution from defendants have themselves recouped their
losses from third parties (that is, ’passed on’ the losses) the High Court has
rejected the view that this forms the basis for denying the plaintiffs’ claims,
either against government payees (Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) v
Royal Insurance Australia Lid)69 or against private citizens (Roxborough v
Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd).7° This is provided, of course, that the
initial transfers of wealth to the defendants were as a result of the receipt of
65 P Birks, ’The Law of Restitution at the End of an Epoch’ (1999) 28 WALR 13 at 56.
66 (2008) 232 CLR 635; 247 ALR 412; [2008] HCA 27; BC200804500.
67 Restatement, above n 1, p 369.
68 See also the views of Professor Rendleman in the United States, who takes an approach even
more claimant-friendly than that of the Restatement: D Rendleman, ’Quantum Meruit for the
Subcontractor: Has Restitution Jumped off Dawson’s Dock?’ (2001) 79 Texas L Rev 2055.
Rendleman treats unjust enrichment as a broad, moral principle that justifies allowing a
subcontractor’s claim in some circumstances. He considers that the limiting principles used
to restrict restitution ’prevent the court from reversing unanticipated specific instances of
unjust enrichment’ (at 2064) and exist in ’tension with the courts quest for justice, explicit
in the policy against unjust enrichment’ (at 2057).
69 (1994) 182 CLR 51; 126 ALR 1; 69 ALJR 51; BC9404663, but note the possibility that a
successful claimant might in some circumstances hold the proceeds for those parties to
whom the losses were passed on. See Brennan J at CLR 90-1 (Toohey and McHugh JJ
agreeing) and Mason CJ at CLR 75~5.
70 (2001) 208 CLR 516; 185 ALR 335; [2001] HCA 68; BC200107592. There is some force in
Kirby J’s dissent, however, particularly at [143].
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the claimants’ money or property, such receipt being ’at the expense of’ the
claimant and giving rise to the unjust enrichment of the defendant.71 The
Restatement takes the opposite approach: it accepts that a passing on defence
will apply in relation to taxes that have been erroneously or unlawfully
assessed or collected (§ 19), unless restitution ’would facilitate recovery by
the persons ultimately entitled to relief’ (§ 64(lb)).72 This suggests that the
notion of corresponding loss is even more critical to the Restatement, so that
the purpose of the remedy is not only to reverse enrichment but also to
overcome loss. Not only must the corresponding, loss thus initially come from
the claimant (as in Australia), jt must remain with the claimant: the motive of
reversing enrichment in this context appears even less of a concern under the
Restatement than in Australia.73
Conclusion
The Restatement is a magnificent achievement. Obviously, the concept of
unjust enrichment is at the very heart of the project. It features prominently in
all of the specific rules of the Restatement. Perhaps surprisingly, however,
although I am an unjust enrichment sceptic, the precise formulations of those
rules, the analysis in the commentary, and the outcomes of the illustrations
that exemplify those rules, conform for the most part to my own views.
Ultimately, the critical test for the validity of the rules in the Restatement is
whether they conform with the case law and lead to acceptable outcomes, for
in my view, of far greater importance than any debate and divisions about
grand theory, genetic concepts or taxonomical structures, what divides or
unites judges and legal commentators is their response to specific factual
problems (real or hypothetical). Hence the illustrations in the Restatement are
invaluable as a test for the justice and efficacy of the adopted rules and they
generally confirm the legitimacy of those rules.
Whether unjust enrichment is needed to justify many of the conclusions of
the Restatement is an open question that the Restatement itself does not
answer. In parts, unjust enrichment appears to be more of a descriptive label;
but this is unproblematic since the work as a whole is a brilliant statement of
the law as it operates in all its richness, and is a rejection of dogma.
The Restatement brilliantly demonstrates the correctness of the High
Court’s observation in relation to equity, but one that applies equally to the
law of restitution, that ’the experience of the law does not suggest debilitation
by absence of a sufficiently rigid taxonomy’.74 If the unjust enrichment
theorists were awaiting the Restatement as the next major weapon in their
crusade, they will be disappointed. I have the suspicion, albeit one whose
71 Ibid, at [26] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne J J, citing Mason CJ in Commissioners of
State Revenue (Vic) v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 51 at 75; 126 ALR 1;
69 ALJR 51; BC9404663.
72 See Restatement, above n 1, p 267, Illustration 18, as well as § 64, and vol 2, pp 508-10,
Illustrations 3-6.
73 Unjust enrichment theorists have also generally rejected a passing on defence. See, eg,
Edelman and Bant, above n 10, pp 127-8.
74 Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (formerly Willis & Bowring Mortgage Investments Ltd)
(2009) 239 CLR 269; 260 ALR 71; [2009] HCA 44; BC200909276 at [91]-[94] per
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ.
The Third Restatement of Restitution 175
accuracy will be for the future to determine, that many of the solutions that the
Restatement adopts will be decried by unjust enrichment theorists. If so, the
Restatement may well be the first staging point in the turning of the tide
against the self-referential (and I would suggest arid) academic theoretical
writing that has dominated much of the recent debate. Unlike the Restatement,
such theory is ’several removes from the life of the law’, to quote Gummow J
writing extra-judicially in a related context.75 Perhaps the ’great project’76 of
reordering private law may even crumble. I, for one, would welcome that
prospect.
75 See Justice W Gummow, ’Equity; Too Successful?’ (2003) 77 ALJ 30 at 41.
76 Cf R Sutton, ’"We Just Mislaid It": The Great Project and the Problem of Order in Private
Law’ (2005) 11 Otago L Rev 97.
